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The Journal of Psychiatry & Law/Summer 1994
Assessing the quality of expert
testimony in cases involving
children
BY STEPHEN A. NEWMAN, J.D.
Mental health experts must be held to a high standard of quality
when presenting opinions in legal cases involving children. This
article sets forth a number of suggestions for judges, lawyers, and
mental health professionals themselves to consider in preparing,
scrutinizing, and judging the quality offorensic reports and
testimony. The many pitfalls offorensic work need to be understood
if such expertise is to be given its proper weight in these cases.
Forty-five years ago, in Courts on Trial, Judge Jerome Frank
identified the essential difficulty of factfinding when he titled
one chapter of his book "Facts Are Guesses."' Disputed facts
must be guessed at, using the array of aids common to the
courtroom: physical evidence, documents, demonstrations,
lay witnesses of varying degrees of probity and accuracy, and
experts. For courts to do justice, Frank observed, they must
not only come up with the right legal rule, they must also
make the correct findings of fact. Because Frank saw numer-
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ous flaws in the factfinding process, he feared that too often
justice was not rendered in adjudicated cases.
In cases involving children, the integrity of the factfinding
process is crucial. Modem cases in family and divorce courts
often feature drastic allegations of child sexual abuse, of
physical cruelty, of parental indifference and neglect. Deci-
sions of lasting consequence regularly turn on the facts found
by the court.
Reports and testimony from specialists in the social sciences
play an increasing and sometimes dominant2 role in these
cases. But however confidently they speak, these experts too
are only guessing at the facts. Judge David L. Bazelon, a
jurist well known for his efforts to make law responsive to
the insights offered by psychology, once told an audience of
psychiatrists:
The "educated guess" that psychiatrists provide-and it is only an
educated guess-is only as good as the investigation, the facts, and
the reasoning that underlies it?
When the social science expert enters the legal arena, lawyers
and judges may be tempted to simply defer, trusting in the
expert's greater knowledge of psychology, human relation-
ships, and children. But Judge Bazelon's echo of Judge
Frank's remark about facts-as-guesses cautions against uncrit-
ical deference.
Indeed, when experts offer their educated guesses, their opin-
ions must be assessed as carefully as the testimony of other
witnesses, but with certain unique considerations in mind.
This article sets forth various criteria for making an assess-
ment of the quality of this evidence. By sometimes highlight-
ing the pitfalls of expert testimony, I do not mean to deny its
importance in family cases. Indeed, it is sometimes the case
that vital information about a child can be elicited only out-
side the courtroom, in the settings and conditions provided by
the mental health profession. And mental health profession-
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als are uniquely situated to supply empirical data, explain
research studies, and assist in the application of the available
knowledge from psychology to the case at hand.
Their importance makes it all the more imperative that mental
health experts be held to a high standard of quality when pre-
senting opinions and recommendations in court. This in turn
requires informed cross-examination by lawyers (something
not always done well in these cases5) and judicial awareness
of the virtues and pitfalls of this type of testimony.
Legal professionals must avoid the conclusion that what the
expert offers is purely "scientific." Clinical opinion-the
form of expertise most often heard in family cases-is a
blend of many things: expert knowledge, theoretical prefer-
ences, beliefs derived from the expert's unique set of past
clinical cases, inferences and interpretations drawn from
interviews with and observations of the principal actors in the
case, predictions of future behavior, and individual character,
values, intuition and judgment. It is subject to many limita-
tions, both professional and personal, discussed in more
detail throughout this article. The quality of an opinion is
highly dependent upon the knowledge and skill of the indi-
vidual evaluator; in the words of two commentators, "the
clinician himself-his ability to observe, to interact, to feel,
and to sense intuitively-becomes the chief instrument ' 6 in
the clinical search for truth.
It is well to remember that even in the modern age, the ideal
decision maker in family matters is not the scientist, but the
wise man. It is not the knowledge of an Einstein or a Freud
that we desire in the most troublesome cases, but the wisdom
of a Solomon. With this in mind, I offer the following cau-
tions, caveats, and criteria for the assessment of the quality of
expert testimony in legal cases involving children.
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1. Competence
The expert's
level of
general
competence
In court, competence is usually measured by reference to the
expert's credentials. Credentials are a kind of shorthand for
experts with the judgment, intelligence, and training to per-
form the necessary professional tasks, to explain the state of
knowledge that exists, and to extrapolate reasonably from
that knowledge. Psychiatrists, psychologists, and social
workers, the usual experts appearing in family matters, are
identified by their educational degrees, licenses, depth of
training, and years of experience.7
Credentials sometimes confer undeserved respectability. The
field of psychology has spawned various experts whose claim
to expertise is questioned by other mental health profession-
als. Marian Hall, former director of psychology at Minneapo-
lis Children's Medical Center, decries a "cottage industry" of
so-called professionals [specializing in child sexual abuse] who are
employed by public agencies or available for hire by private parties
in divorce and custody disputes and who have little or no special-
ized training in child development, child assessment, mental health,
or human sexuality. Too frequently, their weekend workshops and
seminars have focused on frenzied approaches and altruistic inten-
tions about what is best for the child.'
Hall goes on to describe the weekend workshops and semi-
nars certain activist mental health professionals attend-no
doubt cited to courts as impressive evidence of their expertise
and training-as misguided, scientifically worthless efforts.
Professional experience is often used as a yardstick in assess-
ing the competence of an expert. But experience is not neces-
sarily a good marker for competence. Testimony of poor
quality in child sex abuse cases often is delivered by so-
called "validators" who appear to be qualified because of
experience. One New York Family Court judge has written:
I am concerned by the proliferation of unqualified "validators,"
many of whom possess no more than marginal scientific and educa-
Did the
expert do a
competent
job in this
particular
case?
tional credentials necessary for qualification as an expert, but who
are able to bootstrap their evaluations by reciting the number of
validations they have done and the number of times they have been
qualified as expert witnesses in other cases. Routinely, the quality
of the prior evaluations is not examined, and many of the prior
evaluations were without objection or adequate examination of the
expert's credentials.9
These problems are compounded by the fact that many clini-
cal experts never obtain feedback on how their prior recom-
mendations have fared. Without feedback, there is no
opportunity to learn from one's early mistakes, or even to
know if what one is doing is scientifically valid.'0 Indeed,
some experts may simply repeat their errors over and over
again for years-and then claim to be experienced. Whether
clinicians with years of experience ever get any feedback in
the course of their work ought to be a routine question in
court proceedings involving children.
Even well-credentialed experts go astray in particular cases.
An unfortunate example was set by Dr. Marshall Schecter, a
distinguished emeritus professor of child psychiatry at the
University of Pennsylvania, when he testified in the Baby
M.11 case. Schecter claimed that Mary Beth Whitehead was
not a good mother for her baby because she didn't play the
right way with her infant. He criticized this mother for choos-
ing to play with stuffed animals instead of pots and pans. His
views on this, and on the psychologically correct way to play
"patty-cake," made him the subject of a very amusing, and
devastating, column by New York Times critic Russell Baker,
which Baker entitled "Mom Flunks Patty-Cake."'12 Schecter,
despite his impeccable credentials, had for some reason
delivered testimony that sounded absurd.
Another pitfall for the competent expert is the temptation to
stray beyond one's competence. When their own expertise
runs out, instead of keeping quiet, some experts boldly pro-
ceed to offer testimony in a realm that they have not ade-
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quately practiced or studied. Legal professionals must be sen-
sitive to the boundaries of expertise if they are to rein in the
wandering expert.
2. Thoroughness of the expert's evaluation
Was the time
devoted to
the clinical
evaluation
adequate?
Experts sometimes fail to devote adequate time to forensic
evaluations. This is not due simply to incompetence. Experts
are busy, workloads are heavy, and other time demands
intrude. Those pressed for time may cut corners in various
ways: by relying on information from records rather than
conducting personal interviews, by speaking briefly to key
people on the phone, by neglecting sources of information
that would be tapped were there more time, and by ending
inquiries prematurely. Lawyers should be alert to pick up
indications of these practices in the expert's own reports, and
to ask about sources of information that might have been con-
sulted if the expert had had more time. 3
Sometimes courts (or attorneys) will not pay for an adequate
evaluation. A court may limit fees unreasonably, making it
difficult for any expert to do a proper job. Attorneys hiring
experts may also seek a low-cost evaluation. Experts need to
be prepared to educate their legal clients as to the time
demands of evaluations, and to turn down cases that are
doomed because of inadequate reimbursement arrangements.
While there is no fixed time for performing such tasks as a
child custody evaluation or a sexual abuse inquiry, some
mental health professionals have offered rough temporal
guidelines. For child custody evaluations, Dianne Skafte, a
private therapist and custody evaluator, suggests a time
investment of approximately 16 hours for a family of two
parents and one child, with an added two hours for each addi-
tional child. 4 For sexual abuse evaluations, Anne H. Meltzer
and April Kuchuk present a protocol that incorporates sug-
gestions from various professional organizations.' 5 It calls for
Were the
interviews
conducted
over too
compressed
a time
period?
a minimum of two interviews with the child, "with an aver-
age range of two to six interviews. The length of individual
interviews can vary from 30 minutes to two hours, depending
upon the child's tolerance." Additional sources of informa-
tion are suggested (e.g., review of records, interview with
parent and caregiver), but no time limits are given in the pro-
tocol for them.
Brief evaluations leave wide gaps in knowledge, overempha-
size first impressions, and produce poorly substantiated con-
clusions.
Dr. Alan Levy warns of a "snapshot effect,"'1 in which the
expert, in a brief look at the family, or even a look that is
adequate in terms of hours spent but is not spread out over
time, is misled by atypical behavior or only temporarily
impaired psychological functioning. This effect, which Levy
feels "contaminates and threatens to distort many custody
evaluations," leads the evaluator to draw conclusions based
upon evidence from moods, behavior and psychological
states that later change, especially as the individual's high
level of stress and anxiety in the midst of litigation dimin-
ishes over time.
Levy describes how the tension of a custody battle can lead
parents to behave atypically badly or well in the evaluation
process:
As their anxiety increases, parents may lie, become provocative and
insulting, or even appear close to psychosis. On the other hand,
some parents handle the anxiety with denial and seem to be reason-
able or calm. 17
The expert who sees only a "snapshot" of behavior may reach
inaccurate conclusions about the subject's normal function-
ing. Lawyers should be alert to the possibility that the expert
saw atypical behavior on the particular occasion of the evalu-
ative interview. Nervousness and anxiety may peak at the
interview itself, since it is a critical moment in the litigant's
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life; this agitated state may cause him to act in ways that neg-
atively affect the expert's conclusions.'8
Was all Evaluators must spend sufficient time, and spend it wisely.
appropriate Reports and testimony should routinely inventory all of the
information expert's efforts: who was interviewed, for how long, what
considered? records and documents were examined, what tests or other
materials were employed.
To make a child custody recommendation, the evaluator
should see the children and each parent alone and together in
various combinations.' 9 Housekeepers, teachers 20 and others
regularly in contact with the children are potentially good
additional sources of information. Often evaluators are urged
by the parties to see friends, relatives, and other supporters,
but experienced evaluators rarely find these collateral sources
of real value.2 '
The importance of a thorough, well planned evaluation is
illustrated by Matter of Eli,12 a child sexual abuse case in
which four mental health experts testified. The court found
most reliable Dr. April Kuchuk, who, in her role as court-
appointed psychologist, saw the mother alone twice, the
father alone twice, the child alone three times, the child with
the mother at the mother's home once, and the child with the
father once in her office and once at the father's home. She
also interviewed the child's babysitter and telephoned the
father's therapists, the child's therapist, and the law guardian.
Her solid information base, as well as her persuasive reason-
ing and expert knowledge of the literature in the field,
impressed the court.
In sharp contrast is the expertise offered in Matter of CIR
Children.2 3 A psychologist offered his conclusion that a
teenage child's depression and symptoms of mental distur-
bance stemmed from sexual abuse. But at trial it became clear
that the expert had been entirely unaware of the girl's history
of lifelong emotional disturbance. His conclusion was based
upon the demonstrably false premise that the child's emo-
tional problems started after the alleged time of abuse. After
dissecting the expert's sloppy investigation, the court rejected
what it aptly termed "an opinion offered too casually by one
lacking a sufficiently thorough knowledge of the subject
child's psychological condition and history. . ....
At times, attorneys in custody cases prevent thorough
inquiries by experts, by denying access to their clients (or to
children in their clients' care). An expert is justified in pro-
viding information on only one parent in the dispute, but pro-
fessional ethics codes do require acknowledgment of the lack
of contact with the other parent. Experts need not feel obliged
to offer an opinion about the ultimate issue in the case; testi-
mony is admissible if it supplies the trier of fact with some
useful information that is relevant to the ultimate issue.
3. Use of metaphors
Experts use metaphors and similes as a way to describe psy-
chological concepts in terms understandable to laypersons.
Metaphors in court can be vivid, memorable, and persuasive.
But they can also be misleading. A metaphor highlights the
ways in which one thing is like another, but it masks the dif-
ferences between the two. Metaphors also tend to oversim-
plify the complex psychological concepts they purport to
represent.
An example of a questionable psychological metaphor
occurred in a rape prosecution in Pennsylvania.24 Dr. Ann
Burgess, testifying about rape trauma syndrome, attempted to
explain how a rape victim might be able to identify her
attacker after the passage of four years through flashbacks of
the attack. In describing this flashback phenomenon, Burgess
testified that "you [could] think of the mind like a computer
button" that, when "pressed" by something in the environ-
ment, brings back the "image." This metaphor, equating the
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human mind and memory with the computer's system for
retrieval of information, oversimplifies the complexity of
human memory. It hides the differences between computer
retrieval of data previously entered, commonly experienced
to be perfectly accurate when the right buttons are pushed,
and fallible human memory, which is subject to such prob-
lems as suggestibility and diminishing recall over time. The
expert's metaphor constituted too strong an endorsement of
the victim's ability to make the identifications that she did;
the defendant's conviction was reversed.
In the much publicized "Baby Jessica" custody litigation, 2 an
expert psychologist testified to the devastating effect that
removing a two-year-old child from the only caretakers she
had ever known would have on the child's psychological
well-being. At one point in the testimony, the expert provided
a metaphor to explain this effect:
It's like if you think of a house: The foundation, the frame of the
house, is the first thing you build. You dig a hole and you put down
the cement and you put up the frame. And then you cover it up with
walls, and windows and doors, and decorations. And these decora-
tions will vary depending on the people. And when you look at the
house the only thing you'll see will be the decorations and the win-
dows. And you won't know the nature of the foundation until a
storm comes. And it's only whether or not it can weather the storm
that will tell you how strong the foundation is.
She now has-it's the foundation that she's building up with these
primary [caretakers]. .... 26
Even in a case like this, in which the psychological testimony
about harm to the child is convincing, there is reason to be
cautious about the particular metaphor chosen here. The
foundation of a house is finished early in the house's con-
struction. Thereafter it is not affected by subsequent work
done to create items such as windows and decorations. The
metaphor suggests that the fundamental work of human per-
sonality development is completely "finished" in the first
years of life, and further, that human development, at least in
its fundamental aspects, is not affected by life events that
occur subsequent to the early first years. It is not clear from
the metaphor that the expert wishes to make these assertions,
or whether he believes the metaphor, so interpreted, makes
too strong a claim about the inflexibility of psychological
developmental processes. These implications should have
been explored by counsel, to establish the limits-as well as
the truth-of the metaphor.
4. Theoretical orientation
Expert witnesses make choices about which psychological
theories and techniques to believe in and practice." Since the-
oretical orientation and beliefs vitally influence experts' rec-
ommendations, they should be scrutinized. 8 A striking
example of reliance on theory that contributed to judicial
rejection of expert testimony occurred in Matter of Eli, when
a social worker's psychoanalytic orientation led her to give
"considerable weight to symbolism and the child's play with
certain dolls, including a bear with a long nose . . . which
nose she saw as a phallic symbol." The judge regarded this
interpretation as dubious and did not credit this testimony.
In custody cases, it is especially important that lawyers probe
for the theories of the evaluator. One psychiatric evaluator
has written that homosexuality is a mental disorder, 9 dis-
agreeing with other professional opinion on this point. This
theoretical belief-and the fact that it is rejected by many, if
not most, within the professional community 30 -obviously
must be uncovered in any proceeding involving a homosexual
parent.
Consider another professional controversy, centering on the
question of whether there should be a preference for match-
ing the gender of a parent and a child in custody matters. One
psychiatrist, after setting out the various arguments support-
ing placement with the same-sex parent, says we don't know
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which deprivation-of modeling and identification with the
same-sex parent or of learning how to deal with the opposite-
sex parent-is more serious.3 ' Experts in custody cases
should be questioned about their views on this point, espe-
cially in light of the legal system's reluctance to base awards
on gender.32
Perhaps the best-known expert trio in family law is Gold-
stein, Freud and Solnit, authors of the classic work Beyond
the Best Interest of the Child. The book has had much benefi-
cial influence on the law, but some of these authors' theories
have been attacked by others in the field. Critics have said
Goldstein, Freud and Solnit placed too much emphasis on a
child's single psychological parent, failing to recognize the
psychological importance of both parents to many children.33
And their notion that courts should not order visitation, but
instead allow the custodial parent to determine whether and
when visitation with the non-custodial parent should take
place, has been universally rejected by the courts and criti-
cized in the mental health literature 4
While the ordinary custody case is regarded as a multifac-
tored inquiry into the child's best interests, custody experts
differ on which factors deserve highest priority. Goldstein,
Freud and Solnit placed maximum emphasis on continuity of
psychological ties. Others make such continuity a factor, but
not necessarily an overriding factor.35 The authors of one cus-
tody text state their theoretical preference for these qualities
in a child's custodian: (1) the capacity to nurture and
empathize; (2) the ability to self-scrutinize; and (3) the ability
to value the other parent.36 It is readily apparent that in cer-
tain cases, what an expert recommends will depend upon his
theoretical views.
The latest group of experts coming to the attention of the
legal community are "recovered-memory therapists," who
theorize that childhood sexual abuse is the source of their
patients' problems. Patients who can't recall such abuse are
assumed to be repressing the memory of it and may be treated
with such questionable techniques as the administration of
"truth serum" drugs like sodium amytal.3 7 One psychiatrist
expressed the view that
the main reason for the growth of false charges of abuse has been
the recent proliferation of abuse specialists and therapists, many of
whom lack any knowledge of mental illness or the workings of
memory. These specialists believe fervently that many of the diffi-
culties experienced by the people who consult them are due to sex-
ual abuse that, if it isn't remembered, can be jogged into memory
by various recovery techniques.38
Newspaper accounts39 have given warning to the legal profes-
sion about these theorists, but lawyers cannot rely upon this
haphazard way of receiving information. All experts' theoret-
ical preferences should be uncovered in the legal process and
reviewed for general acceptance within the profession, and
for elements that may be disputed and controversial within
the profession. Ideally, alternative theories that might gener-
ate different opinions about the case at hand should be
brought to the attention of the court.
5. Syndrome testimony
Syndrome testimony in child sexual abuse cases has become
so commonplace that a cautionary word about it is in order
here.
In the prosecution of day care teacher Kelly Michaels,4 0
expert witness Eileen Treacy, possessing a master's degree in
psychology and clinical experience with child sex abuse vic-
tims, presented testimony about the "Child Sex Abuse Syn-
drome." 4' She identified 32 child behaviors that were
supposed to indicate sexual abuse, including eating disorders,
sleep problems, regression, development of fears, and sexual
symptoms. Five to 15 of these behaviors, she claimed, would
likely be found in an abused child. In addition, the abused
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child would likely go through most or all of these phases: (1)
engagement, where the abuser gains the friendship and affec-
tion of the child; (2) sexual interaction with the abuser; (3)
secrecy, in which the abuser threatens or cajoles the child to
keep the secret; (4) disclosure; (5) suppression, in which the
child copes with the abuse by such psychological measures as
denying, avoiding, or rationalizing it. 2
Judicial doubts about the validity of this syndrome testimony
stemmed from Treacy's own admissions about the limitations
of the theory and from the testimony of other experts who
flatly rejected its validity. Treacy admitted that (1) some of
the behavioral symptoms on her list could be caused by other
events; (2) the psychiatric profession's authoritative reference
work, the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual, did not recog-
nize the syndrome; and (3) nearly all of the behaviors she
cited were common to all types of traumatic stress.
Two experts for the defense testified that the 32 indicators of
sexual abuse were too general and vague to be accurate indi-
cators of sexual abuse (one claimed it had no other source
than Treacy herself and had no validity); that the five-phase
hypothesis was a model that had not been tested; and that the
model was in any event a therapeutic tool for clinical treat-
ment, not a diagnostic tool.
The court agreed that syndrome evidence "is not probative of
sexual abuse. The syndrome assumes the presence of sexual
abuse and only seeks to explain the child's reaction to it."
Allowing Treacy to go beyond explaining that delays in
reporting or recantations by children are common in abused
children was deemed error in this criminal trial. 3
Professor Robert Levy traces some of the difficulty with this
syndrome to limitations on the influential original paper by
Dr. Roland Summit, a California psychiatrist who formulated
the "child sexual abuse accommodation syndrome." In Levy's
words:
Dr. Summit's article provided impressionistic, clinical findings but
no data of any kind. Summit did not compare the proven cases of
child sexual abuse in which the syndrome was observed with
proven cases in which the syndrome was not observed. Nor did he
provide any information about unproven allegation cases or cases
involving false allegations in which the child nonetheless exhibited
some or all symptoms of the syndrome. In short, Summit provided
no information from which an informed judgment could be made as
to whether symptoms of the "syndrome" might validly be consid-
ered determinative or even corroborative of sexual abuse."
In 1992 Dr. Summit published a fascinating account of how
his original paper proposing and describing the syndrome had
been misused by lawyers.45 He condemned both "false claims
advanced by prosecutors" and the "effort by defense interests
to strip the paper of any worth or relevance."" Summit
explained that his syndrome was "a clinical opinion, not a
scientific instrument."47 It did not identify an illness or disor-
der but rather attempted to set forth "the responses of normal
children to sexual assault." His original paper made no claim
that the CSAAS was a diagnostic tool to determine the fac-
tual question of whether a child really was abused:
The words identification, detection, diagnosis, symptom, disorder,
illness and pathology, which might infer a diagnostic focus, do not
appear in the paper, nor is there a promise of verifying the alleged
abuse with such words as test, validate, evaluate, confirm, or prove.
. . . The CSAAS is meaningless in court discussion unless there
has been a disputed disclosure, and in that instance the ultimate
issue of truth is the sole responsibility of the trier of fact. The
CSAAS acknowledges that there is no clinical method available to
distinguish "valid" claims from "those that should be treated as fan-
tasy or deception," and it gives no guidelines for discrimination.
The CSAAS is used appropriately in court testimony not to prove a
child was molested but to rebut the myths which prejudice endorse-
ment of delayed or inconsistent disclosure 8
Some judges, however, perhaps misled by testifying experts,
persist in calling the syndrome an accepted diagnosis.9 And
courts in child protective proceedings sometimes allow this
testimony to be used to help prove abuse occurred, even if
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they reject such evidence in criminal cases. 0 But admitting it
still leaves open the question of its value.
Not only lawyers, but mental health experts as well, are
guilty of exaggerating the significance of the syndrome. One
common way experts attempt to enhance the effect of their
syndrome testimony is to state that the behavior observed in
the child is "consistent with" sexual abuse. This locution is
too often used to supply by implication an answer to the cru-
cial question of causation. If the behavior is consistent with
sex abuse, the implication is that sex abuse probably caused
the behavior. But a claim that the behavior is "consistent
with" the sex abuse syndrome does not reveal causes for the
behavior other than sex abuse that may exist. The symptom
of headache is consistent with being hit over the head with a
blunt instrument, but blunt instruments do not cause most
people's headaches.
If "consistent with" testimony is given, judges need to ask
what else the behavior might be "consistent with." Experts
offering to provide the causation probabilities associated with
the different causative possibilities are attempting to resolve
the ultimate issue for the court and are going beyond what
their science can support."'
Summit cites this type of testimony as a misuse of the
CSAAS. He notes that "a child's. . . silence might be said to
be consistent with the CSAAS, as if not complaining proves
the complaint. 52 Silence, of course, also is consistent with no
abuse. What the CSAAS does show is that silence doesn't
rule out abuse, since some abused children do stay silent
because of threats, fear they won't be believed, etc.
What is the future of syndrome testimony? Marian Hall sug-
gests that we can expect mental health professionals to move
away from syndromes and lists of typical symptoms. She
explains:
With the increasing quantity and sophistication of our research it is
becoming more clear that "syndromes" and "profiles," typical
courses, effects, and dynamics do not exist, that in fact, patterns of
child abuse cannot be fit into simple or generalized categories and
must be studied, at least for purposes of legal reporting, on a case-
by-case basis 3.5
Hall expects that ongoing work by researchers will produce
theories that explain the psychological effects of abuse in
more sophisticated terms, commensurate with the complexi-
ties of child development. Sexual abuse will be seen not
merely as producing a standard set of symptoms, but as a
traumatic interference with the child's developing self-image,
developing sexuality, developing sense of control, and devel-
oping sense of trust in relationships. 4
This leaves today's courts working with some experts using
an oversimplified model of sex abuse symptomology. Never-
theless, experts familiar with the syndrome literature and able*
to go beyond it can be helpful. First, they can dispel the
myths about abuse that Summit wrote about (e.g., the myth
that delay in reporting always proves that the child's original
report of abuse was false). Second, they can report on the
emerging research on children's memory, communication
capacities, cognitive abilities, and ability to distinguish fan-
tasy from reality." This may help courts struggling with testi-
mony which in some respects is credible and in some not,
such as occurred in a federal court that heard credible testi-
mony about sex abuse mixed with statements about a dog
driving the young victim to a safe place in a police car.56
Finally, stripped of the syndrome terminology, much expert
testimony offered in sex abuse cases consists of standard clin-
ical observations and insights that if properly supported, con-
tribute to and help clarify the overall picture ultimately
created by all the testimonyY
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6. Evaluative techniques: the use of anatomically
correct dolls
Play therapy is "an established technique for obtaining infor-
mation about the feelings and problems of young children.
58
Psychologist Marian Hall writes:
Reconstructive cues such as puppets, family dolls, drawing materi-
als, and doll house equipment may be useful memory aids for
young children. The supportive nature of nonverbal aids, and espe-
cially the open-ended, nonsuggestive nature of most play materials,
makes the information gathered in such sessions especially valu-
able. 9
One kind of toy-the anatomically correct doll-has gener-
ated intense controversy, however. Some courts" and com-
mentators would treat them as inadmissible. Professor Robert
J. Levy, reviewing the literature on dolls in a 1989 article, 6'
claims that the few empirical studies supporting the use of
dolls "are shallow as well as narrow." Using small sample
sizes, and failing to study the reactions to these dolls of chil-
dren who have not been sexually abused, the studies, says
Levy, draw unjustified conclusions about what can be learned
from the doll play. He complains that the dolls are not stan-
dardized. Two prosecutors are quoted as saying:
Dolls from different manufacturers may look quite different from
each other. Some dolls have a look children find friendly, while
others may appear menacing. Some dolls are completely out of
scale, with disproportionately large sexual parts. The same is true in
the child-adult size ratio. Some dolls are so bizarre looking that
their use may unintentionally add humor to the case.
In the prosecution of Kelly Michaels, a New Jersey appellate
court expressed skepticism about the way in which dolls were
used in that case:
Anatomical dolls were used in the interviews, and in some cases the
children did not disclose anything until they were either presented
with the dolls, shown various eating utensils, or encouraged to
demonstrate how Kelly might have hurt a little boy or girl. The
records of the interviews show that these methods caused certain
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children to use their imagination and stray from reality, even to the
dismay of the investigator at times.62
The court went on to cite the "Manual of the National Center
for Prosecution of Child Abuse," whose guidelines indicate
the dolls "may not be appropriate in all instances, and that
careful attention should be paid to the methods employed
when they are used."
The dolls need not, however, be thought of as a scientific test
requiring empirical validation. In the words of a Michigan
appeals court, they "are a tool to permit children to communi-
cate ideas which they are unable to express verbally because
they are too young or anxiety-ridden or because they lack the
vocabulary. '6 3 Experts who use the dolls must be aware of
their potential to stimulate fantasy play, but the dolls may
also be used to demonstrate real experiences of sexual abuse.
This causes some experts to reject the notion that doll play is
always inherently unreliable."
While anatomically correct dolls are generally suggestive of
sexuality, what a particular child does or says about them
may not be suggested by their mere presence. Nelson v. Far-
rey65 provides an example. Nelson was convicted in a Wis-
consin state court of molesting his three-year-old daughter.
Following the conviction, he sought habeas corpus relief in
federal court. The evidence included the child's hearsay state-
ments, related to the court by Dr. Donald McLean, a clinical
psychologist who did extensive therapy with the child. In one
session, the child put a male and a female doll, both anatomi-
cally complete, in a position simulating fellatio. The girl then
said that the female got "mud on her face" that was "white
and sticky." The court acknowledged the general risk that
dolls with sexual parts might elicit "fantasy and not recall"
but noted that "[m]erely playing with anatomically correct
dolls would not have given her the idea that one might be
sprayed with 'white mud' from an erect penis. '6 6 The child's
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doll play, description of the sexual act, and other evidence in
the case clearly demonstrated that molestation had occurred.
Interpretation of doll play is complicated by parental coach-
ing. Parents contending that abuse occurred may provide,
even unwittingly, the sexual language and sexual knowledge
that a child would not otherwise have (many parents, for
example, expose their children to sexually oriented educa-
tional materials designed to show them how to avoid sexual
abuse). Experts who conclude that children displaying age-
inappropriate sexual knowledge must have experienced abuse
may be making the unstated assumption that no coaching
took place-an assumption that may well be untrue in the
particular case.
While evidence from doll play alone is inconclusive, it can be
of value if part of a total evidentiary picture that supports a
finding of abuse. It is unhelpful if produced in ways that are
too unreliable for legal factfinding purposes. To assess the
evidence, a judge must learn in each case in which dolls are
used: when and how the dolls were introduced into the inves-
tigation; what instructions or directions were given to the
child about the doll; what the dolls looked like; and what had
occurred in the investigation up to that point that might have
influenced how the child responded to the dolls.
Courts must also distinguish two different uses of the dolls:
(1) to interpret the child's play, and (2) to help the child make
his or her own statements about the alleged abusive incident.
In the first instance, the child's play does not directly com-
municate a memory of the event; rather, the play requires
interpretation by the expert (e.g., the child violently throws
the adult male doll across the room; the expert interprets this
as anger against the accused). In the second type of doll use,
the dolls inspire the child to make a statement about the
abuse itself (e.g., the child recounts how and where the
accused touched her, pointing to body parts on the doll).
Each different use requires different legal assessment. How
convincingly experts interpret play (for example, how they
interpret body language, drawings, or other non-verbal
behavior) depends upon the persuasiveness of the reasoning
offered in support of their interpretation and upon how well
this one interpretation fits into the entire evidentiary picture.
How convincing the child's doll-facilitated statements are
depends upon the credibility of the child in terms of recall,
suggestibility, consistency with prior acts and statements, etc.
Perhaps the best resolution for now is that offered by one
professional organization, the American Professional Society
on the Abuse of Children:
Anatomically detailed dolls should be used with care and discre-
tion. Preferred practice is to have them available for identification
of body parts, clarification of previous statements, or demonstration
by non- or low-verbal children after there is an indication of abuse
activity.
The anatomically detailed dolls should not be considered a diagnos-
tic test. Unusual behaVior with dolls may suggest further lines of
inquiry and should be noted in the evaluation report, but is not gen-
erally considered conclusive of a history of sexual abuse .6
7. Evaluative techniques: the child interview
Interviewing children is an art. The difficulties are consider-
able: some children may be unwilling to communicate at all;
others may be too willing to say whatever they think the
interviewer wants to hear. Researchers are just now beginning
to explore children's capacity for understanding, for recalling
details of past events, and for distinguishing truth from imag-
ination.68 Courts now must deal with complex realities-for
example, the fact that children's accounts may mix true sto-
ries of abuse with fantasy elements.6 9
Concerns about interviewing technique are especially acute in
the area of child sexual abuse. As more courts are exposed to
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the techniques mental health professionals and law enforce-
ment officials use to gather information from children, the
pressure increases on these investigators to conduct their
inquiries with greater care.
The Michaels case provides a catalog of interviewing pitfalls.
The appellate court, reversing jury verdicts against Ms.
Michaels on numerous sex abuse counts, recounted the ways
in which investigators prejudiced the gathering of legally
worthwhile information:
1. Many interviews contained extremely leading and/or suggestive
questions.
2. Certain questions planted sexual information in the children's
minds and supplied the children with knowledge and vocabulary
which might be considered inappropriate for children of their
age group.
3. Children were encouraged to help police "bust this case wide
open."
4. Peer pressure and even threats of disclosing to the other children
that the child being questioned was uncooperative were used. A
child was told that she needed to talk to help her friends and that
the investigator had already spoken to five other children who
revealed what happened.
5. In some cases, certain children were told in detail what another
child had disclosed.
6. Sexualized discourse was encouraged and applauded.
7. [A]ll of these young children were convinced, either by their
own experiences, other children, investigators, parents, or some
combination thereof, that defendant was "bad" because she had
done "bad things" to children at Wee Care. . . Children were
told they could keep Kelly locked in jail by cooperating; there-
fore, they and their families would be safe.
8. In several instances, the children were tired and/or resistant to
participating in the interviews, but the investigators continued to
press for cooperation.
By using peer pressure and rewards, suggesting answers, sup-
plying sexual knowledge and vocabulary, offering informa-
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tion from other child interviews, and forcing children to con-
tinue unwanted interviews, the investigators contaminated
whatever results their interviews produced. This is not to say
that there is no room for the occasional leading question,
offer of sympathy, and reward for cooperation. The legal sys-
tem should not set its evidentiary standards so high that chil-
dren are deprived of compassion, care and sensitivity when
they are asked to recall experiences of abuse. Nor should
interviewers be held to an unattainable standard of perfection.
A child interview that produced persuasive evidence of abuse
occurred in the child protective proceeding Matter of E.M.70
The court approvingly noted the interviewer's technique of
asking some questions designed to test the child's capacity to
recall and generally using "carefully phrased" interview
questions. The judge was also impressed by the way in which
the interviewer set forth her criteria for evaluating this nine-
year-old child's account, specifically:
The child had a good capacity for accurate recall; the story was
clear and coherent; the child related to the examiner in an age-
appropriate manner; and significantly, the child's emotional reac-
tions in the interview (what might be termed the child's "affect
pattern") included manifestations of anxiety and shame that were
consistent with post-traumatic stress, that is, the way individuals
who have undergone traumatic events, in this instance sexual abuse,
later recount the traumatic event.7'
Another interviewer in the case added that the child was "one
of the most sexually preoccupied children he had seen in his
long experience." Both experts' testimony fit in well with the
other evidence in the case, including the consistency of the
story the child told to several different people at different
times, the child's own clear statement of the abusive act and
identification of the abuser, and the child's attainment of the
developmental capacity to render a reliable account of what
had happened to her.
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8. Biases: the influence of experts' own values, beliefs
and attitudes
Experts, like anyone else, are not value-free. In the words of
one professor of psychology: "Subjectivity and perspective
enter into their interpretations of research findings," and pro-
fessional judgments are "shaped by their educational, social
and political background.'" 2
Exactly how professional judgments are affected by personal
background factors is difficult for an outsider to determine,
even if all the relevant background facts were known. Psychi-
atrist Richard Gardner, writing of child custody evaluators,
says that reminders of emotionally significant events in the
expert's life create problems:
The therapist who has been involved personally in a custody battle,
for his (her) own children, is not as likely to be as objective as the
colleague who has not had the misfortune to be embroiled in such a
conflict. The likelihood that such a therapist will identify irra-
tionally or inappropriately with one of the parties is high. The like-
lihood that there will be similarities between the examiner's own
experiences and that of one, or even both, of the clients is great.
And such similarities are likely to evoke emotional responses that
becloud objectivity."
In the widely publicized Baby M. case, one expert testifying
in the case had himself been involved in a bitter custody bat-
tle.7 This was Dr. Lee Salk, who testified in very strong
terms against the baby's mother, Mary Beth Whitehead15 Salk
made his custody recommendation without ever meeting the
mother; he claimed to be perfectly confident in forming his
opinion based upon written reports filed by other experts in
the case. This sort of dubious professional conduct suggests
that experts be asked about their personal experiences, at
least to see if there are direct parallels between the case at
hand and the expert's own life experience.
Experts may also be influenced by personal reactions to peo-
ple they meet in the litigation. Alan Levy has written of
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experts who are angered by lawyers or litigants they find irri-
tating or obnoxious. Strong personal reactions, whether posi-
tive or negative, can be a powerful unconscious influence on
the mental health examiner.76
Other sources of bias are commonplace personal beliefs and
attitudes, such as a tendency toward optimism or pessimism:
The personal biases and prejudices of the psychiatrist which are
evident in his daily activities are also difficult to exclude from his
testimony. For example, one expert may be more optimistic than
another. These biases are components of the human personality and
must be accepted as such.'
Personal beliefs and professional beliefs blend together in the
expert's own professional self-image. An expert may see her-
self in her profession as a pioneer, a child saver, an icono-
clast, a reformer, a feminist, or an innovative theoretician, to
name just a few possible roles. The chosen self-image may be
entirely altruistic. Yet it may exert a subtle distortive influ-
ence on the expert's judgment in individual cases that are not
good candidates for activism, innovation, theory building,
etc.
Uncovering sources of bias is not an easy task. Hints of bias
may appear in testimony that is emotionally delivered, resis-
tant to change in light of new facts, or delivered with abso-
lute certainty. An expert who distorts the known facts, places
emphasis on seemingly irrelevant details, or is inappropri-
ately harsh on one party or indulgent toward another may be
acting out of personal beliefs and attitudes rather than profes-
sional expertise.7 1
9. Advocacy by the "neutral" expert
Although social scientists are "trained . to disclose the
weakness of their findings and the limitations of their
methodology" and "to be modest about the implications of
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their studies and cautious about generalizing from their
research findings to other situations,' 79 once they form a con-
clusion they may become advocates for their own opinion.
Lawyers and the legal atmosphere may pressure even the
neutral expert to frame opinions in the most persuasive way
possible and to do what's necessary to ensure that the expert's
own conclusion prevails in court. In testifying, such an expert
may lose the objectivity that he or she started out with at the
beginning of the inquiry.
Dr. Bernard Diamond, attempting to expose the "fallacy of
the impartial expert" many years ago, claimed that the reality
of the courtroom environment and of human nature inevitably
induced partisanship:
Because his testimony does in fact support one side of the legal bat-
tle. . [the expert], if he is at all human, must necessarily identify
himself with his own opinion, and subjectively desire that "his
side" win. . . . [The expert may sometimes affect] a more aloof,
detached facsimile of impartiality that masks his secret hope for
victory of his own opinion. Such a detached witness may be totally
unconscious of the innumerable subtle distortions and biases in his
testimony that spring from this wish to triumph. 0
Diamond's point, made in the context of insanity defenses in
criminal law, can readily be extended to experts offering tes-
timony in cases involving children. Once an opinion is
formed favoring one party or another on the ultimate issue in
the case, the expert's strong desire is to see his recommenda-
tions implemented, to ensure that justice is done for the child.
Altruism strengthens partisanship, and objectivity suffers.
Advocacy of one's own opinion may lead to some commonly
observed sins of omission and commission. Testimony may
be shaped to draw attention to some facts and away from oth-
ers. Reservations, difficulties or doubts are suppressed. Theo-
ries and conclusions are stated with confidence, however
tenuous or weakly supported."1 There is no disclosure of
uncertainty, imprecision, or ambiguity.
10. Commitment to one's own conclusion
in the inquiry phase
A problem related to advocacy on the witness stand occurs
prior to the delivery of testimony, in the evaluation process.
At some point in the course of the expert's inquiry, she will
reach some conclusions, even if tentative, about key issues in
the case. After that point, the expert's perceptions may be
affected by those conclusions. It is a commonplace observa-
tion that one sees what one expects to see and screens out the
rest. An evaluator who comes to the conclusion that a partic-
ular child is telling the truth about sexual abuse, for example,
may thereafter pay careful attention to the accumulation of all
positive evidence supporting that conclusion while dismiss-
ing contrary evidence as unlikely, unpersuasive, or inconse-
quential."
Experts who become wedded to their conclusions may resist
significant evidence that contradicts them. The experience of
the trial judge in Matter of Eli is instructive:
I heard expert testimony from Barbara Pilcher, a certified social
worker, who was the child's psychotherapist. . . . It was Ms.
Pilcher who is responsible, in great part, for the mother's belief that
the child was sexually abused by her father. One cannot escape the
conclusion that subsequent events have caused her to become rigid
in her opinion that sexual abuse occurred, even in the face of con-
siderable evidence to the contrary.
An expert who suggests a mother's fears of abuse are true has
to feel invested in and responsible for the vigorous litigation
that is likely to ensue. Such an expert may feel as committed
as any party to seeking vindication in court.
11. Uncertainty and ambiguity in psychological knowledge
No precision instruments exist to directly measure human
nature or personality. Expertise in the areas of interest in
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family law is less advanced and less scientific than some
mental health professionals might lead one to believe. 3
Uncertainty and ambiguity bedevil the mental health profes-
sion (as they do the legal profession). Factions within the
mental health community fight with each other, sometimes in
fierce terms that don't surface when they testify in court.1
4
The facts of individual cases may not fit neatly into legal or
mental health categories, and the categories themselves are
sometimes suspect. As one psychologist has noted, human
beings are so variable that the range of behavior considered
"normal" overlaps the symptoms of mental disorder."
In this context of scientific uncertainty, the basis for expert
opinion must be carefully scrutinized. Opinions stemming
from inferences about motives, relationships, and uncon-
scious drives, and interpretations of verbal and non-verbal
communication and overt behavior, must be adequately
explained, not merely accepted as scientific truth.
Experts are often asked to help determine the sources of psy-
chological symptoms. Why does a particular child, for exam-
ple, display signs of emotional distress? One explanation
offered by an expert in Matter of Eli was sexual abuse by the
child's father. But alternative explanations were available as
well. Other stressors having nothing to do with sexual abuse
existed in the case. One was the fact that the father had sud-
denly moved out of the family residence without a word of
explanation. His wife and daughter came home one day to
find his possessions gone and pictures missing from the
walls. This sudden collapse of family life was an obvious
source of stress. Another was the marital breakdown itself,
even without the dramatic exit of the father. In such cases,
courts, and the lawyers they depend upon for evidence and
argument, must consider and examine alternative explana-
tions for children's behavior that are consistent with the
known facts.
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Explanations of expert opinions are most essential when the
expert ventures a prediction about the future. Predictions may
be offered in custody cases, for example, about how one or
both parents will behave with and care for the child in the
future. If predicting future conduct is deemed essential to the
legal system, experts may be unreasonably pressed to partici-
pate. Consider in this context how authors Bernard L. Dia-
mond and David W. Louisell describe one response to a
predict-the-future request:
Recently one of the authors received a letter from a judge who is
chairman of a crime commission in his state. The letter requested
information as to how a law might be formulated that would guar-
antee that no sexual offender would be discharged from an institu-
tion if he might commit a second offense after his release. The only
logical answer to such an inquiry is the suggestion that the institu-
tion be placed in charge of a skilled and certified fortune-teller.
Psychiatrists generally do not possess such abilities to predict the
future.A
It is not entirely possible to avoid predictions about the future
when the question is the welfare of a child in times to come.
But experts need to stay close to their observations in the
present when they make educated guesses about the future.
12. Research and statistics
Experts are regularly called upon to provide information from
the research they or others have done in the field. While
research knowledge is valuable, there are hazards in too read-
ily accepting the reports of psychological research. Several of
these hazards, for the three broad types of studies done in the
field of psychology that experts draw upon in family law
cases, are discussed below. 7
The Researchers who study large populations attempt to derive
epidemiological conclusions that are generally true for the group under
method study.8 Their results offer general guidance to inquirers in
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particular cases (e.g., a study of suicidal people might iden-
tify factors to look for in deciding if a depressed parent in a
custody case is suicidal).
It is important to 'note that these studies describe populations,
not any individual person. By contrast, legal proceedings
focus on specific children and adults, not on aggregations of
people. Data and statistics that describe the characteristics of
a group cannot be assumed to describe any individual mem-
ber of that group. 9
Neither do population statistics prove cause-and-effect rela-
tionships. Characteristics of the population described by
statistics may be related in a causative way, or the character-
istics may be caused by an unknown factor in the population.
Although experts may speculate about the causes of the popu-
lation characteristics they discover, the numbers themselves
do not answer causation questions.
The Research experiments can provide support for social science
experimental testimony by experts. Experiments are more or less convinc-
method ing depending upon the extent to which the experimental situ-
ation parallels real-world conditions, the methodology is
sound, the findings are subject to peer review, and the results
are replicated by others.
The psychologist's laboratory does not mirror the laboratory
of researchers in the "hard" sciences. Diamond and Louisell
observe that
psychological experimentation is strictly limited. One can rarely
devise an experiment that would have the precision taken for
granted by the chemist and the physicist. Scientific experimentation
consists largely in rigorously controlling irrelevant factors and iso-
lating the variable under investigation. Techniques for doing this
are not easy to devise with human psychology. Important ethical
and humane considerations block the performance of crucial experi-
ments.9
The clinical
method
Experts performing experimental research in psychology
should be cautious about drawing general conclusions from a
given experiment. A recent collection of research work on the
child as witness by well-regarded researchers provides some
useful examples. 91 Researchers acknowledged such problems
as the artificiality of their experimental situations (e.g.,
experimenters conveniently use college students as mock
jurors, although real jurors are not typically college students
and might respond very differently from college students).
The fact that participants in psychosocial experiments know
their actions will not have real-life consequences may lead
them to behave in ways that differ from the ways they would
behave in actual situations in life. Other drawbacks derive
from particular experimental methods-e.g., the use of a sin-
gle child actor in an experiment designed to test juror reac-
tions to the "typical" 12 year-old child. In many instances,
experimenters assume-without knowing-that their subjects
will think and behave in the experimental situation in ways
typical of larger populations that the subjects are presumed to
represent.
One common research technique is to make an in-depth
examination of a small number of subjects. There are major
problems with the use of such studies to derive general psy-
chological principles. In small-scale studies, the few subjects
cannot be assumed to be typical. How subjects were chosen
may affect the results obtained. Studies supporting joint cus-
tody, for example, that look at a few families who volunteer
to try this arrangement and who are willing to be studied
doing it, can hardly justify broad conclusions about the via-
bility of this type of custody arrangement for the general pop-
ulation of divorcing couples. 92
Another problem with small-scale research is the frequent
absence of control groups. One of the best-known studies of
the effects of divorce on children is Wallerstein and Kelly's
Surviving the Breakup. The authors studied only children of
divorce, in 60 California families, without comparing them
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with a control group of children whose families remained
intact. This makes it difficult to say that all the problems
experienced by the children studied were due to their parents'
divorces rather than to other troubling juvenile experiences.
Other research problems include questionable data-gathering
techniques (e.g., determining if a custody arrangement is
working out well for a child by asking the parents to fill out a
questionnaire rather than by the direct observation of the
family by the expert), the non-replication of findings, the
drawing of conclusions that go beyond the limited data actu-
ally found, and the dependence upon assumptions drawn from
the research of others. Finally, a body of research is rarely
entirely consistent; experts should be asked if studies exist
that cast doubt upon or contradict the particular results the
expert has explained.
13. Tests
Much has been written about the misuse and overuse of test-
ing.93 In family cases, legal professionals may ask for psycho-
logical tests to provide objective evidence. The literature,
however, indicates that this is a false hope.
The general shortcomings of psychological testing of children
for legal purposes include inappropriate use of traditional
tests for purposes that differ from those for which the tests
were designed; the uncertain effects of test administration on
test results; the need for subjective interpretation of test
responses; the lack of standardization of some test instru-
ments; and the irrelevance of tests to the resolution of legal
issues.
Dr. Richard Gardner states that in child custody evaluations,
projective tests9 like the Rorschach (reactions to amorphous
ink blots) or the Thematic Apperception Test (subject
requested to make up a story about pictures shown to him)
generally require too much speculation in their interpretation
to be useful in assessing parental capacity or predicting
parental behavior. He observes:
There are judges who will frequently, if not routinely, order psy-
chological tests on both parents and/or children. As mentioned, this
is a manifestation of the judge's naYvet6. It reflects the court's view
(promulgated by mental health professionals) that these tests are
"objective" and that they provide information that is much more
accurate than clinical observations. The judge here has probably
been duped into the belief that there is something more objective
and scientific about [such tests]. 95
The result is testing that encourages "each party's bringing in
a parade of professionals to provide different explanations for
the same projective data."96
Another expert points out that assessment instruments like
the Rorschach and Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inven-
tory (MMPI) tests "were not designed to assess parents' rela-
tionships to children, nor to assess parents' childrearing
attitudes and capacities, and these are often the central ques-
tions in child custody cases."97
Marian Hall" offers several reasons to discount the testing
that is sometimes done in sexual abuse cases. She advises
that the tests have "poorly standardized instructions" and that
the use of "adolescent and adult projective techniques with
preschool children to ascertain presence or absence of spe-
cific target events is invalid." She dismisses many "diagnos-
tic devices that presume to give quick and absolute values to
behavioral probabilities" as "equally questionable." She con-
cludes:
If oversimplified and nonstandardized tests are no more appropriate
than using traditional tests for nontraditional purposes, then it
would appear that we are left with the task of using our best obser-
vational skills and, with the help of the normal accoutrements of
play, allowing children to tell us in words and actions what they
can about the events of their lives.99
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Experts trained in therapeutic practice and procedure may
err if they unthinkingly transfer their professional standards
of conduct to the litigation context. Some of the potential
problems are described in the following four items.
14. Factfinding by experts
In their therapeutic work, clinicians do their own factfinding
by taking histories, conducting interviews, and reviewing
records. But in forensic evaluations, expert factfinding can be
a hazard, sometimes destroying the value of the entire effort.
History-taking in the clinical practice of therapy may provide
useful information about the patient's past. Success in treat-
ment is not necessarily based upon accuracy in memory, how-
ever; the "historical truth" of what is said by the patient is of
lesser moment than helping patients to function better in the
present and to cope with their emotional problems, whatever
the source. Even therapists who help a patient to progress
toward improved mental well-being cannot vouch for the
accuracy of memories of the past. 100
Custody and other forensic evaluations are quite different
contexts for history-taking. Interviewees are not seeking help,
but trying to achieve a purpose. Parties to a custody battle
will wish to persuade the expert of their superiority and their
partner's inferiority. The motive to overstate, to embellish,
and to distort the truth of past events, in order to win in liti-
gation, is apparent.
An experienced evaluator, Dr. Alan Levy, identifies the
expert's attempt to find the truth of past events as a major pit-
fall in child custody work. Levy describes how the custody
evaluator is drawn into the morass of truth-seeking:
First you hear impassioned, lengthy and detailed allegations reading
like a laundry list and then you are asked to read a stack of court
papers. It is almost certain that you are going to be faced with dia-
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metrically opposed statements by the parents. At this point it is
tempting to see if you can determine who is telling the "truth" and
who is not. This can prove to be a fruitless and time-consuming
mission and is best left to the courts.
Instead of trying to reconstruct past events, however relevant
they may be, "[t]he evaluator is urged rather to rely on
his/her clinical skills which emphasizes interviewing and
observation of parents and children." 101
Writing about child sex abuse inquiries, Dr. Marian Hall indi-
cates that evaluators can offer much of significance through
observational analysis: "An experienced child psychologist,
observing a child in its natural environment in the presence
of the customary caretakers as well as in a one-to-one play
situation, is able to assess developmental level, quality of
attachment to parents or other caretakers, adequacy of stimu-
lation and security in the environment, and to screen for the
need for further specialized evaluations."' 02
Experts who develop facts through firsthand observations are
on much firmer ground than experts who try to do factfinding
about past events in their offices. The latter may founder due
to lack of access to all information sources or to reliance on
accounts given by interested parties. Thus the expert may err
if:
1. She accepts one party's version of the facts.
2. He accepts the facts told by any other self-serving or partisan
informant (with the exception of admissions that run contrary to
the party's own self-interest).
3. She relies on hearsay contained in records or supplied to her in
conversations with parties or other informants.
4. He attempts to fill in gaps in the factual picture by making
unwarranted factual inferences and assumptions.
Matter of CIR Children'03 presents an example of an erring
expert accepting the facts told to him by a teenage girl alleg-
ing sexual abuse by her stepfather. The teenager related that
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before the alleged abuse she had been a "pretty good stu-
dent," but that afterward she had difficulty even "getting up
in the morning and going to school." The expert accepted the
truth of this, and also accepted the young woman's descrip-
tion of her recent newly experienced sleep problems. But in
court the facts of these matters emerged quite differently.
School records showed that the girl was a no-show student
with an extensive truancy record that extended back for
months before the alleged abuse. And the supposedly new
sleep problems were in truth not new at all, but longstanding
symptoms of the girl's severe emotional problems.
The desire to fill in gaps in factual knowledge may lead
experts to make questionable inferences and assumptions.',,
This may account for some of the flaws in expert testimony
that occurred in Allen v. Farrow.°s A team of experts from
the Child Sexual Abuse Clinic at Yale-New Haven Hospital
was asked to look into charges that filmmaker Woody Allen
sexually abused his daughter Dylan. The team's report was
deemed unreliable by the trial judge primarily because it:
1. Made visitation recommendations despite never having observed
the parent and child interact together.
2. Drew conclusions about Satchel, another child in the custody
dispute, though the team never saw him.
3. Concluded there had been no sexual abuse when the supporting
data were inconclusive on the point.101
Clinicians hear many factual statements in the course of their
inquiries, and it may not be practical to expect them to disre-
gard all factual statements that are not proved according to
some legal standard. It is important therefore, that experts be
asked to disclose the source of the facts upon which they base
their conclusions, with particular "efforts. .. made to distin-
guish those material facts and observations that the expert
experienced firsthand from those known to the expert via sec-
ondary sources."''0 7
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Determining where the truth lies may require a broader inves-
tigation than the expert is able to undertake. In court, the
judge may hear from a wider set of characters than the
expert.' °8 The expert lacks certain factfinding tools available
in the courtroom. To facilitate factfinding, the legal system
provides such devices as subpoena power, compelled testi-
mony under oath, and cross-examination. When conflicting
stories are told by fierce partisans engaged in a battle over a
child, these tools may be essential to any hope of uncovering
the truth.
15. Use and assessment of evidence
In their own practices, mental health experts may make rec-
ommendations or take actions based upon evidence that
would not be sufficient for the legal system, given the legal
system's different purposes and standards of proof. The thera-
peutic enterprise is a practical effort to improve mental
health. If some treatment course might work, based upon
some evidence, perhaps incomplete or uncertain, a clinician
may initiate it. Decisions may be difficult precisely because
evidence is scant, but "clinicians . . .are trained to tolerate
ambiguity while providing concrete recommendations, often
with an exaggerated voice of authority (which it is thought
may have its own therapeutic effects)."' 9
Judge Bazelon characterized the "clinical mind-set" as one
that
no matter how informed by scientific education, is practical. It
seeks to find ways to help clients now. It knows that practice pre-
cedes knowledge and that to await certain knowledge is to abdicate
practice. Sometimes this practical sense translates into . . . over-
confidence. .... "I
Acting in accordance with their training, experience and
practical mind-set, mental health professionals may testify to
"findings" and conclusions that are not supported enough to
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satisfy a legal judgment with enduring legal consequences
(even though the evidence might satisfy the professional's
"reasonable basis for treatment" standard)."'
16. Anecdotal evidence from the limited universe of
clinical practice
Another potential contaminant of clinical judgment is the
inevitable influence of the particular set of clinical experi-
ences of the expert. This is essentially the problem of draw-
ing conclusions from studies using small sample sizes; the
sample here is the clinician's own practice. While we expect
clinicians to learn from experience, there is no guarantee that
these experiences are typical, and general propositions drawn
from them may be erroneous.
Despite limited information provided by clinical practice, one
commentator claims that "clinicians frequently are suffi-
ciently enamored of the value of clinical observations that
they regard verification of outside factual information tend-
ing to confirm their clinical conclusions as unnecessary and a
waste of time." 2
17. Distorting effects of therapeutic qualities such as
empathy and loyalty
In a therapist, empathy is good; in an evaluator, it may be an
impediment to accuracy and objectivity. When a mental
health expert who has been treating one of the parties testi-
fies, he may feel loyalty to and empathize with his patient. A
therapeutic alliance can be helpful in the effort to relieve psy-
chic suffering, but it can be a source of bias and error in
forming objective opinions for legal purposes."3
Even where there is no prior therapeutic relationship, the
expert's empathetic responses may be aroused by one of the
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parties. Neutral evaluators may be tempted to engage in some
therapeutic work with the evaluation subject. Psychiatrist
Alan A. Stone writes that "once the forensic examiner has
decided that his or her testimony will be helpful to the eval-
uee, it is not unusual to permit the relationship to become an
intensely therapeutic encounter. Thus the expert often enters
the deposition or courtroom deeply involved in a transfer-
ence/countertransference .. ."I" Objectivity is sacrificed
when the expert/therapist gets emotionally involved with and
professionally committed to the evaluee/patient."5
18. Special concerns of mental health professionals
about the risk of error
A psychology expert in a child abuse case may be affected by
her judgment about which is worse: to err in saying abuse
occurred when it didn't, or to err in concluding it did not
occur when it did. While experts may profess equal concern
about making either error, it is at least plausible that those
with an intimate personal or professional knowledge of the
horrors of child abuse would be inclined to more strenuously
avoid the possibility of sending a child back into the arms of
an abuser. To borrow from legal terminology, such an expert
might consider evidence that abuse occurred as overcome
only by clear and convincing evidence-or even evidence
beyond a reasonable doubt-that it did not." 6
Conclusion
After surveying the difficulties in assessing the quality of
expert testimony in children's cases, I suggest a few conclu-
sions for professionals involved in these cases to consider.
1. Don't pressure experts for "the answer. " All too fre-
quently they don't know it, although some are too willing to
offer an opinion that goes beyond their role and the evidence
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they have to offer. It is best to define their role as developers
of information through interviewing and observation, as theo-
rists explaining the significance of facts, and as articulators
of matters not within the everyday experience of laypersons.
2. Integrate experts' evidence with the traditional sources of
evidence gathered by courts. Mental health professionals are
just part of the total effort to answer questions relevant to the
law. Every source of information contributes to the overall
picture that must be the basis for a judicial decision.
3. Evidence that doesn't require expertise ought not to be
slighted. For example, the parties in a custody case may offer
uncontradicted accounts detailing the amount of time each
has spent with their child and the actual caretaking each has
performed. This deserves considerable weight in the out-
come, whether experts testify or not.
4. Don't write off partisan experts-they may be a needed
corrective to a pbor-quality neutral expert. Psychologists
Aber and Repucci observe that "there is often no substitute
for another point of view from a qualified critic.11" 7 Allen v.
Farrow demonstrates the use of a qualified critic to elucidate
the inadequacies of a report by a team of "neutral experts."
5. Recognize that the available knowledge from psychology
is in flux, at times full of ambiguity, at times frustratingly
inconclusive. The mental health profession is now in a pro-
cess of discussing, suggesting, proposing theories, inventing
protocols, and refining or replacing earlier ideas about issues
relevant to children's issues in court. The profession has its
internal disagreements and its competing theorists of every
stripe and description. Its practitioners include pioneers, res-
cuers, self-promoters, activists with special agendas, tradi-
tionalists, idealists, innovators, reformers, eccentrics and
oddballs; in short, the same cast of characters as in any other
profession.
The best expert offers not just educated opinions, but facts
developed in the course of the professional evaluation, coher-
ent explanations, and wisdom. Back in 1976 New York State
Chief Judge Charles Breitel wrote what are fitting final words
about experts in cases involving children:
In custody matters parties and courts may be very dependent on the
auxiliary services of psychiatrists, psychologists, and trained social
workers. This is good. But it may be an evil when the dependence
is too obsequious or routine or the experts too casual. Particularly
important is this caution where. . . publicly compensated experts
or experts compensated by only one side have uncurbed leave to
express opinions which may be subjective or are not narrowly con-
trolled by the underlying facts.""
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